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Pro [Whose?] Choice: How the Growing
Recognition of a Fetus’ Right to Life Takes
the Constitutionality out of Roe
Rachel Warren*
If this suggestion of personhood is established, the [case for abortion
rights] of course, collapses, for the fetus’ right to life is then
guaranteed specifically by the [Fourteenth] Amendment.1

INTRODUCTION
Roe v. Wade’s2 granting of constitutional protection for the
right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy was, in many ways,
just the beginning of the true abortion rights debate.3 The rights
of the unborn are a main issue in this debate—mainly whether
they have rights as a human person that could protect their lives
from ending before birth. While the Court has since declined to
officially and fully address the issue, there is a growing
recognition of the personhood of the unborn child both from a
medical4 and social5 standpoint. One cannot help but wonder
what impact the expanding recognition of fetal rights will have
on the already shaky future of Roe.
This Comment will argue that recent trends in legislation
and modern scientific development call for the fulfillment of Roe’s
own acknowledgement that the right to life will “collapse” the
right to an abortion. Part I lays out the history of abortion

* J.D. Candidate 2010, Chapman University School of Law. B.S. Music Industry,
University of Southern California. I would like to thank Professor Celestine McConville
for her invaluable guidance throughout the writing process, and Professor Ronald
Rotunda and Steve Aden for their thoughtful advice. I would also like to thank my
husband, whose endless encouragement and unconditional support will forever amaze me.
1 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156–57 (1973).
2 Id. at 113.
3 Amy Lotierzo, The Unborn Child, a Forgotten Interest: Reexamining Roe in Light
of Increased Recognition of Fetal Rights, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 279, 279 (2006) (pointing out
that it was the landmark decision that spurred the “increasing recognition and expansion
of the rights of unborn children in the various areas of the law”).
4 See Robert L. Stenger, Embryos, Fetuses, and Babies: Treated as Persons and
Treated with Respect, 2 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 33, 38 (2006) (showing how modern
advances in the medical and scientific fields have led to conclusory evidence that human
life is present from first existence).
5 This Comment uses state and federal laws that give rights to the unborn to gauge
the current societal values. See infra note 81.
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jurisprudence, from the cases predating Roe, the Roe decision
itself, and finally the cases following Roe. Part II establishes the
widespread acceptance of fetal humanity and rights in both
science and law, as well as the likelihood that abortion
jurisprudence is ripe for upheaval. Part III then calls attention
to the unavoidable competing interests of mother and child which
the Court must address, as well as preliminary solutions
anticipated by others. Part IV concludes that, when weighing
these conflicting interests, the right to life must prevail over the
right to an abortion.6
I. HISTORY: ROE V. WADE AND ITS PROGENY
A. The Road to Roe
Historically, the road leading to the Court’s landmark
decisions in Roe v. Wade7 and Doe v. Bolton8 was built upon the
Fourteenth Amendment’s right of privacy.9 Eight years before
Roe officially constitutionalized the practice of abortion, the
Court extended the right of privacy to the use of contraceptives
by married couples in Griswold v. Connecticut.10 This decision
marked the first time the Court expanded this right to
reproductive decisions.11 The Court defended the right of privacy
within the context of a private activity between spouses within
their home, but never addressed practices independent of
marriage or outside the home.12
The leap from scrutinizing contraceptive restrictions to
abortion laws came six years later when the Court addressed a
statute that criminalized abortions unless it was “necessary for
6 It is important to understand at the outset that this Comment discusses the
conflicting interests of the right to life versus the right of liberty associated with abortion,
as opposed to the conflicting rights to live arising from potentially-fatal pregnancies.
Because the right to abortion is currently based on the liberty-over-life reasoning, the
latter “self-defense” argument is a topic best reserved for another day. It should also be
noted that a statute with an exception to save the woman’s life was precisely the type of
law struck down in Roe. See infra note 189.
7 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
8 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
9 Martin Rhonheimer, Fundamental Rights, Moral Law, and the Legal Defense of
Life in a Constitutional Democracy, 43 AM. J. JURIS. 135, 157 (1998). The concept of a
constitutional right of privacy was first introduced in a Harvard Law Review article by
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, where it was suggested that “each individual had the
right to choose to share or not to share with others information about his or her ‘private
life, habits, acts, and relations.’” Dorothy J. Glancy, The Invention of the Right of Privacy,
21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979) (quoting Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890)).
10 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965).
11 Id.
12 Id. The Court called the invasion of privacy “repulsive to the notions of privacy
surrounding the marriage relationship.” Id. at 486.
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the preservation of the mother’s life or health.”13 In United
States v. Vuitch, the Court held that a District of Columbia
statute was not vague and broadened permissible abortions by
expanding the term “health” to include both physical and
psychological well-being.14 The majority did not delve into a
privacy rights analysis for this particular statute.15 However,
Justice Douglas’ dissent suggested that a “compelling personal
interest in marital privacy” also included “the limitation of family
size,” thus giving the Griswold holding a new possible
application.16
While a decision in Roe was pending, the Court briefly
turned back to contraceptive restrictions in Eisenstadt v. Baird
and expanded Griswold to include the use of contraceptives by
unmarried individuals.17 Eisenstadt was also significant for
abortion rights, as the Court laid groundwork for extending the
right of privacy from simply preventing a pregnancy to
terminating a pregnancy by asserting that “[i]f the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.”18
Building on these principles, the Court delivered its
decisions in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton in 1973. In this pair
of cases handed down on the same day, the Court granted
constitutional protection for abortions and rejected the notion of
an unborn child’s status as a person under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and hence, its right to life.19
B. The Landmark Decisions: Constitutional Right of Abortion
Solidified
Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton arose out of state statutes
that, similar to the one upheld in Vuitch and found in the
majority of the states, prohibited abortions except in situations

United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 68 (1971).
Id. at 72; Karen J. Lewis, Abortion: Judicial Control, in ABORTION-MURDER OR
MERCY?: ANALYSIS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 1, 2 (Francois B. Gerard ed., 2001).
15 Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 73.
16 Id. at 78 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
17 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454–55 (1972). The Court acknowledged that
the Griswold holding was based on the state having no business to enter into the sacred
marital relationship, but nevertheless deemed this right to be inherent in individuals as
well. Id. at 453.
18 Id. (emphasis omitted).
19 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 201 (1973).
13
14
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where it was necessary to save the mother’s life.20 In a 7–2 vote,
the Roe Court invalidated the statute and held that the “right of
privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s
concept of personal liberty . . . [or] in the Ninth Amendment’s
reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass
a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”21
Thus, the constitutional right to an abortion was established.
But what about the constitutional right to life?
The
competing interest of fetal life turned on the Court’s decision as
to whether the fetus was a person and therefore also had
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.22 One might
expect that the right to live becomes inherent once that life
begins. However, Justice Blackmun specifically declined to
address the issue, writing that the absence of a consensus in
scientific and sociological ideology meant that the Court “need
not resolve the difficult question of when life begins.”23 Instead,
the Court simply held that the use of the word “person” within
the Fourteenth Amendment referred to only post-birth.24 As
such, any interest in the protection of the fetus could not be
considered compelling enough to legitimize restrictions through
the entire pregnancy.25

20 Roe, 410 U.S. at 117–118; Doe, 410 U.S. at 182–83 n.4. Roe was a challenge to a
Texas statute that made it a crime to “procure an abortion” at any stage of pregnancy,
subject to up to five years in prison with an exception only to save the mother’s life. Roe,
410 U.S. at 117 n.1. The class action lawsuit was spearheaded by a pregnant single
woman, Jane Roe, along with her physician, James Hubert Hallford, who asserted that
the statute was unconstitutionally vague and infringed upon the woman’s individual right
of privacy under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 120.
Doe was a challenge to a similar Georgia statute, distinguishable from Roe in that it
provided for more exceptions—serious threats to the mother’s health, likely grave birth
defects, and pregnancies resulting from rape—and proscribed a sentence of up to ten
years. Doe, 410 U.S. at 183.
21 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
22 See id. at 156–57.
23 Id. at 159. One scholar has pointed out that just a few pages later, Justice
Blackmun referred to the unborn child as “the potentiality of human life,” thereby
indicating that a judgment call was in fact made as to whether the unborn was “human.”
Michelle Haynes, Inner Turmoil: Redefining the Individual and the Conflict of Rights
Between Woman and Fetus Created by the Prenatal Protection Act, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L.
REV. 131, 135 (2004) (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 162 (emphasis added)).
24 Charles I. Lugosi, Respecting Human Life in 21st Century America: A Moral
Perspective to Extend Civil Rights to the Unborn from Creation to Natural Death, 48 ST.
LOUIS U. L. J. 425, 431 (2004). Rather than rely on information provided by the Defense
regarding fetal development, the Court declined to find a clear definition of “person”
within the Constitution. Instead, the Court focused on the Constitution’s use of the word
“citizen” which referenced a postnatal state. Despite the fact that “person,” not “citizen,”
was used in the Fourteenth Amendment, and despite the fact that state statutes
expressly defined unborn children as human beings, the Court held that the unborn child
had no rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157–58
(1973).
25 Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
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While the unborn child could not assert any rights, the Court
recognized that this newly-established “fundamental right” to an
abortion was qualified and therefore subject to possible
restrictions that served a compelling state interest.26 The Court
again refused to use the beginning of life as a threshold and
instead held that any state interest in preserving the life of the
unborn would not be sustained until the fetus reached the point
of what Justice Blackmun called “viability”—when the child
could “live outside the mother’s womb and ultimately function as
a contributing member of society.”27
Although science at that time was unclear as to when
“viability” began, the Court set standards based on “present
medical knowledge” of the trimester progress of the pregnancy
and declared that viability was reached only after the first
trimester.28 Within the first trimester, no state interference was
permissible; any decision to abort the pregnancy was left to the
mother and her physician.29 In the second trimester, the state
may begin to assert regulations, but only if reasonably related to
the mother’s physical well-being.30 Even into the third trimester
when the state interest becomes compelling, any regulations
must contain an exception “to preserve the life or health of the
mother.”31
Significantly, however, the Court left the door open to revisit
the issue upon more scientific evidence as to the personhood of
the fetus, stating that “[w]hen those trained in the respective
disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to
arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the
development of man’s knowledge, is not in a position to speculate
as to the answer.”32 Moreover, the Court stated that if the
personhood of the fetus were established, the case for abortion

26 Id. at 154; Lugosi, supra note 24, at 431–32. Because the unborn child had just
been deemed a non-person, the compelling state interest was in the protection of
“potential life.” See Michael S. Robbins, The Fetal Protection Act: Redefining “Person” for
the Purposes of Arkansas’ Criminal Homicide Statutes, 54 ARK. L. REV. 75, 85 (2001).
27 Robbins, supra note 26, at 85; Lewis, supra note 14, at 4.
28 Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
29 Id.; Lugosi, supra note 24, at 432.
30 Roe, 410 U.S. at 163; Haynes, supra note 23, at 135–36.
31 Lugosi, supra note 24, at 432 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163–64). As will
be shown in the concurrent opinion of Doe v. Bolton, to preserve the “health” of the mother
means “all factors, physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s age.” Doe
v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973). See infra note 35 for further analysis of the combined
holdings.
32 Roe, 410 U.S. at 159. The modern consensus of these areas is discussed in Part II,
infra.
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rights “of course, collapses, for the fetus’ right to life is then
guaranteed specifically by the [Fourteenth] Amendment.”33
In Doe v. Bolton, the Court built upon Roe’s newly-founded
principles and expanded Vuitch to define “health” as including
“all factors—physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the
woman’s age—relevant to the well-being of the patient.”34 The
significance of this holding is that states were now severely
limited in establishing any compelling interest in restricting
Roe’s constitutional right.35
C. The Aftermath: Regret and Calls for a Re-Visitation
In the decades that followed Roe and Doe, the Court
continued to expand abortion rights based on the unquestioned
principles of the right of privacy and non-person fetal character.
These expansions included striking down requirements of
spousal or parental notification,36 scrutinizing attempts to
restrict public funding for non-therapeutic abortions37 and
narrowing the requirements for informed consent.38 Within a few
years, the Court again addressed the viability issue, reiterating

33 Id. at 156–57 (emphasis added). The fulfillment of this acknowledgement or
“promise” by the Roe Court is discussed further in Part IV, infra.
34 Doe, 410 U.S. 179, 192.
35 JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, DISPELLING THE MYTHS OF ABORTION HISTORY 695
(2006). Many states had restricted abortions to that which was necessary to preserve the
health of the mother, with the intent that abortions be permitted only in life-or-death
situations. With Doe giving “health” such an expansive definition, such statutes were
now unconstitutional. Instead, a woman was entitled to what scholars have called
“abortion on demand.” FRANCIS J. BECKWITH, DEFENDING LIFE: A MORAL AND LEGAL CASE
AGAINST ABORTION CHOICE 20 (2007).
36 See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth 428 U.S. 52, 69, 74–75 (1976) (holding that a
married woman need not secure her husband’s consent to get an abortion as this would
constitute an unconstitutional veto power of a third party; likewise, a minor need not
secure consent of a parent to get an abortion); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979)
(affirming Danforth’s invalidation of blanket parental consent requirements);; City of
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 441–42 (1983) (affirming
Danforth and Bellotti). But see Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 492–94
(1983) (approving a parental consent statute because it contained a provision for judicial
bypass).
37 Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 443–47 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470 (1977);
see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 302, 322 (1980) (upholding the Hyde Amendment,
which placed a limit on federal funding for abortions through HHS programs such as
Medicaid to cases where an abortion would be necessary to save the woman’s life, when
pregnancy has resulted from rape or incest, or situations where the pregnancy caused the
woman “severe and long-lasting physical health damage”).
38 See City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 450 (invalidating a 24-hour waiting period after
consent); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
759–60 (1986) (striking down an informed consent statute that provided for disclosure of
fetal development, possible psychological side effects and alternatives to the procedure on
the grounds that this information might discourage the patient).
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that the health of the woman would always prevail over the life
of the unborn child.39
Even in affirming Roe and Doe, the holding and reasoning
began to be questioned by the Court itself. A decade after Roe,
medical technology had advanced enough to detect “viability” as
early as twenty weeks.40 As a result, in City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health,41 three Justices—O’Connor,
White and Rehnquist—voted to discard the use of Roe as a
precedent. Justice O’Connor criticized the trimester framework
as “completely unworkable” because the stages of pregnancy
would always “differ according to the level of medical technology
available.”42
Another significant criticism of Roe arose in Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists.43 Chief
Justice Burger, who had concurred in Roe, now filed a dissenting
opinion in which he called for its reexamination.44 Chief Justice
Burger expressed his regret that the concerns listed in the Roe
dissents—endorsement of “abortion on demand” and the
invalidation of any interest to protect fetal life—had now become
an unwanted reality.45 Justice White attacked Roe’s illogical
viability standard, pointing out that “the State’s interest, if
compelling after viability, is equally compelling before
viability.”46 Justice Stevens, though concurring in the majority
opinion, took the opportunity to explain further that the right to

39 Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 386–87 (1979).
In Colautti, the Court
considered whether to uphold a statute that required physicians to “preserve the life and
health of the fetus [as though it were] intended to be born and not aborted” when the
fetus is viable or if there is “sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable.” Id.
at 380–81 n.1. The Court found the statute was unconstitutionally vague because the
term “may be viable” was not distinguishable from Roe’s definition of “viability.” Id. at
390. It also reaffirmed that the health of the woman must always prevail over the life of
the fetus. Id. at 400–01.
40 BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 20. Roe had declared viability occurring only after
twenty-four to twenty-eight weeks. Id.
41 City of Akron, 462 U.S. 416, 418. Here, the majority acted characteristically in
striking down an ordinance that required all second-trimester abortions to be performed
in a hospital because it failed to serve the state’s interest of protecting the woman’s
health. Id. at 449–52.
42 Id. at 452, 454 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor went so far as to
admit that if viability kept getting pushed back all the way to conception, the right to
have an abortion would disappear. BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 20.
43 Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747
(1986). Here, the Court invalidated a statute requiring physicians to disclose alternative
procedures, fetal development and possible psychological side-effects when obtaining
informed consent and called for a second physician to be present in situations where the
fetus might survive. Id. at 759–64.
44 Id. at 785 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
45 Id. at 783–84 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
46 Id. at 795 (White, J., dissenting).

Do Not Delete

228

2/6/2010 4:36 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 13:221

life would trump the right to abortion in all states if the
personhood of a fetus were to be recognized, stating:
[I]ndeed, if there is not such a difference [between a child and a fetus],
the permissibility of terminating the life of a fetus could scarcely be
left to the will of the state legislatures. And if distinctions may be
drawn between a fetus and a human being in terms of the state
interest in their protection—even though the fetus represents one of
“those who will be citizens”—it seems to me quite odd to argue that
distinctions may not also be drawn between the state interest in
protecting the freshly fertilized egg and the state interest in
protecting the 9-month-gestated, fully sentient fetus on the eve of
birth. Recognition of this distinction is supported not only by logic,
but also by history and by our shared experiences.47

This logical reasoning seems to have resonated when the
Court found itself addressing the viability issue again only a few
years later in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.48 The
Court adopted the City of Akron and Thornburgh dissents in
admitting that its constitutional construction of Roe’s trimester
system was “unsound in principle and unworkable” and thus
stare decisis should not be invoked to uphold it.49
The Court stopped short, however, of overruling Roe.50 In
admonishing the majority for failing to do so, Justice Scalia
pointed out that Roe itself precluded any state from attempting
to enact an identical statute, and therefore Roe would only ever

Id. at 779 (Stevens, J., concurring) (internal footnotes omitted).
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989). Here, the
preamble to the challenged Missouri statute provided that the State recognized human
life from conception and therefore all unborn children had rights as full citizens. MO.
REV. STAT. § 1.205 (2000). Though this was contrary to its characterization of the fetus in
Roe, the Court declined to determine the constitutionality of the preamble on the grounds
that it did not in itself place regulations on abortion. Webster, 492 U.S. at 506. The Court
asserted that it would place “no limitation on the authority of a State to make a value
judgment favoring childbirth over abortion.” Id. (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474
(1977)).
49 Webster, 492 U.S. at 518. According to the Court, the “rigid Roe framework” of
trimesters and viability was inconsistent with the Constitution’s general terms and
principles. The resulting effect of Roe was therefore a “web of legal rules that have
become increasingly intricate, resembling a code of regulations rather than a body of
constitutional doctrine.” Id. The Court also echoed Justice White’s dissent in Thornburgh
by stating “we do not see why the State's interest in protecting potential human life
should come into existence only at the point of viability, and that there should therefore
be a rigid line allowing state regulation after viability but prohibiting it before viability.”
Id. at 519.
50 BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 33. The reason cited by the Court was that the
differing facts of the two cases made a complete reversal inappropriate: in Roe, the Court
was considering a Texas statute that criminalized all abortions, while in the present case
Missouri had merely determined that potential human life must be safeguarded at
viability. Webster, 492 U.S. at 521.
47
48
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“be disassembled doorjamb by doorjamb, and never entirely
brought down, no matter how wrong it may be.”51
One of these disassembled “doorjambs” came with Planned
Parenthood v. Casey.52 The plurality opinion rejected Webster’s
outlook on stare decisis and announced that Roe was not
“unworkable” despite its “engendered disapproval” and thus
upheld Roe’s viability standard.53 Yet, its refusal to overturn Roe
was based solely on “precedential force” rather than the
“soundness of Roe’s resolution of the issue;” the Casey opinion
never affirmed that Roe was a correct constitutional
interpretation.54 Such an omission subtlety, but quite tellingly,
distances the Court from Roe’s reasoning and provides evidence
of its recognition of the landmark decision’s flaws.
Most significant to abortion jurisprudence applicability, the
Casey Court did not label abortion as a “fundamental” right.55
Instead, the Court acknowledged that Roe’s progeny had vastly
ignored the state’s legitimate interest in protecting potential life
because the rigid trimester framework made it nearly impossible
for any regulation to be imposed within the first twelve weeks of
pregnancy.56
The Court attempted to repair this flaw by
replacing Roe’s strict scrutiny standard with an “undue burden”
test.57 This new standard permits states to enact regulations
with the “purpose or effect” to protect potential life insofar as it
does not place a “substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s
choice.”58 As a result, state regulations are more likely to pass
scrutiny.59

Webster, 492 U.S. at 537 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). The Court evaluated the
constitutionality of a Pennsylvania Act with the usual categories of restrictions: informed
consent, parental approval and spousal notification. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3203–3209
(2000). The Court upheld four of the five provisions in the Act and struck down the
spousal notification requirement. BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 33.
53 Casey, 505 U.S. at 860–61.
Interestingly, this joint opinion included Justice
Kennedy, who had just three years prior joined Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Webster opinion
that asserted exactly the opposite. Webster, 492 U.S. at 496. After outlining the
ramifications of overturning such a landmark decision, the Casey Court admitted that its
decision was in part due to the fear that such an overruling would cause a loss of
confidence in the Judiciary. Casey, 505 U.S. at 867.
54 Casey, 505 U.S. at 871; PAUL BENJAMIN LINTON, ABORTION UNDER STATE
CONSTITUTIONS: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS 6–7 n.13 (2008).
55 LINTON, supra note 54, at 6 n.13.
56 Casey, 505 U.S. at 872. The Court pointed to Thornburg and City of Akron as
examples. Id.
57 BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 33–34; Lewis, supra note 14, at 14.
58 Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. See also Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997)
(modifying the two-pronged Casey test of “purpose or effect” to just “effect”).
59 Lewis, supra note 14, at 14. The Court further elaborated that a state’s interest in
protecting the unborn meant that it could enact rules to ensure that the woman was fully
informed of her options. Under this standard, a state may even enforce measures to
51
52
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Casey’s first major application by the Court was in Stenberg
v. Carhart.60 Here, the Court struck down a partial-birth
abortion ban on the grounds that it placed an undue burden in
the woman’s path to getting the abortion.61 Because this
procedure, known as Dilation and Extraction (“D&X”),62 could be
performed pre-viability,63 and because the language of the
statute could be confused for a permissible pre and post-viability
procedure called Dilation and Evacuation (“D&E”),64 the Court
found that the statute posed an undue, and thus
unconstitutional, burden.65 The Court ignored the obvious
viability issue, even though the child would have survived out of
the womb had the doctor not killed her before delivery was
complete.66
In response to Stenberg, Congress passed the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 2003, which remedied the flaws in the
Nebraska statute by clearly describing the procedure so as not to
be confused with D&E.67 Congress also provided an exception to

persuade a woman to choose childbirth over abortion. This includes philosophic and
social arguments, even during the first trimester. Casey, 505 U.S. 872–73, 878.
60 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
61 Id. at 929–30. The Nebraska statute at issue restricted the practice of the partial
delivery of “a living unborn child before killing the unborn child and completing delivery.”
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-326(9) (LexisNexis 2008). The Court also invalidated the
statute because it made an exception only to save the life of the mother, rather than the
Casey-required exception to promote the health of the mother. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930.
62 The D&X procedure, also known as “intact D&E,” is accomplished by the
physician first dilating the woman’s cervix and then using forceps to rotate the child to
the breach position and pull the legs, body and arms through the cervix and vagina. Once
the head is visible and lodged in the cervix, the physician forces scissors into the base of
the skull and makes a large opening, in which he inserts a suction catheter to suck out
the child’s brains and collapse the skull. Once all contents of the brain are sucked out,
the physician completes delivery by pulling out the emptied head. The partially-born
child has been observed clasping her fingers and kicking her feet until the physician
begins to use the suction tube, at which point the body goes limp. Gonzales v. Carhart,
550 U.S. 124, 137–39 (2007).
63 Even the Plaintiff physician admitted that the D&X procedure would never be
attempted before the sixteenth week but instead was actually intended for later-term
pregnancies. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 927–28.
64 The D&E procedure consists of the physician first dilating the woman’s cervix and
then inserting forceps, which are used to grab the unborn child and pull it through the
cervix and vagina. In the process, the friction of the forceps causes the child to be torn
apart, and the physician removes the body piece by piece until completely removed. It
typically takes the physician 10–15 passes to remove all pieces of the dismembered body.
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 135–36.
65 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 938–40.
66 The separate dissenting opinions of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia,
Kennedy and Thomas, however, did not let the issue slide. Each found that the very
description of the procedure itself lent to an undisputable finding of protectable life and
suggest how close the Court had been to overturning Roe. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 952
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 953–56 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Id. at 956–79
(Kennedy, J., dissenting); Id. at 980–1020 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
67 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006).
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save the mother’s life68 and, unlike the state legislature,
successfully cited findings that the procedure would never be
medically necessary to preserve the woman’s health.69 Thus,
when challenged in Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court was obliged to
find the undue burden in Stenberg remedied and upheld the
ban.70 In addition to making strides towards protecting the
unborn child, Gonzales also disassembled another Roe “doorjamb”
by accepting the absence of a health exception.71 The Court
found the exception to save the mother’s life sufficient, even
though it essentially requires the woman to go to court first.72
This is a far cry from Roe’s establishment of abortion on
demand.73 While concurring in the majority, Justice Thomas—
joined by Justice Scalia—reiterated that “the Court’s abortion
jurisprudence, including Casey and Roe . . . has no basis in the
Constitution.”74
It is apparent that the abortion issue is as ripe as it has ever
been. Casey has re-opened the door to fetal rights, and Roe itself
admitted that the legal status of abortion rights should change
upon a better understanding of “when life begins.”75 Thus, an
understanding of today’s scientific progress and the state’s
acceptance of the unborn child’s personhood has a profound
impact on the abortion issue.76 With the trend moving toward
recognition of fetal humanity, a fundamental issue arises which
cannot be ignored in an inevitable reevaluation of Roe: does a
woman’s right to privacy truly outweigh a child’s right to live?77

68 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (2006) (stating that the prohibition on the procedure “does not
apply to a partial-birth abortion that is necessary to save the life of a mother whose life is
endangered”).
69 Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–105, § 2(13), 117 Stat.
1201 (2003).
70 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007).
71 Id. at 161–65.
72 18 U.S.C. § 1531(d)(1) (2006); Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 168.
73 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
74 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 169 (Thomas, J., concurring).
75 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973); Lugosi, supra note 24, at 437 (arguing that
Casey “suggest[s] that it is time to think ‘outside the box’ and directly answer two
questions: whether, as a matter of law, the unborn are living human beings and whether
the law should confer constitutional personhood on unborn human beings from the time of
conception until the time of natural death”).
76 The scientific data and trends in state laws have been pointing toward a
widespread recognition that the unborn child is not only a living human being, but also a
citizen entitled to protection. The analysis of this data will be discussed immediately
proceeding in Part II, infra.
77 This issue, its resolution among scholars and this author’s solution will be
discussed in Parts III and IV, infra.
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II. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS: THE REJECTION OF ROE AND
ACCEPTANCE OF FETAL PERSONHOOD
Within the Roe opinion itself, Justice Blackmun’s majority
admitted that its rejection of the personhood of—and the
constitutional protection for—the life of the fetus was related to
the fact that “those trained in the respective disciplines of
medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any
consensus.”78 While there may not have been such a consensus
at that time, the passing of thirty-six years has allowed the
expansion of medical technology and social understanding to
close this gap. Today, there is a trend toward recognizing the
unborn as both a human as well as a person afforded lawful
protection.79 Modern scientific advances in the understanding of
human development show that the fetus is indeed a human being
from her first day of existence.80 Societal values as reflected in
current state laws81 show trends towards fetal personhood and
citizenship—thirty-six states consider the killing of the fetus a
form of homicide.82 This is an increase from twenty-seven states
just five years ago.83 Further, even several Supreme Court
Justices who dissented in Stengerg have expressed recognition of
fetal humanity.84 These developments, coupled with the ongoing
cumulative criticism of Roe’s reasoning,85 call for a reevaluation
of the abortion rights issue with new consideration given to the
life of the unborn.
A. The Widespread Criticisms of Wrongful Reasoning
An argument for fetal personhood would be moot if Roe and
its progeny were universally hailed as an accurate constitutional
Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
The recognition of both humanity and personhood is important in a reevaluation
of Roe. Scientific proof of the moment the unborn becomes a human being is key;
however, it means nothing if the Constitution does not protect this human as a “person”
under its law. This is where trends in both state and federal law become essential, as
each have given protection to the unborn child as a person and a citizen.
80 Stenger, supra note 4, at 38.
81 While “philosophy” by its very nature may never be conclusive, societal value
trends are the best gauge of the philosophical climate of the times. This Comment uses
current trends in state laws to measure the values of society as a whole, and as will be
discussed, infra Subsection C, the results are quite telling.
82 Americans United for Life, Fetal Homicide: Model Legislation & Policy Guide for
the 2009 Legislative Year, available at http://www.aul.org/xm_client/client_documents
/LegislativeGuides/AUL_Fetal-Homicide-2009-LG.pdf (outlining the states with such
provisions and specifying when in the gestation period these rights are realized).
83 M. Todd Parker, A Changing of the Guard: The Propriety of Appointing Guardians
for Fetuses, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1419, 1428 (2004).
84 See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 952 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Id. at
953–56 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Id. at 956–79 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Id. at 980–1020
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
85 BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 23.
78
79
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application. As discussed above, however, the opinion sparked
regret and calls for an overturning by the Justices themselves.86
Congress attempted to take matters into its own hands and tried
to pass constitutional amendments to overrule and reverse the
case.87 While both governmental attempts have yet to be
successful, scholarly criticism continues to unravel the
constitutional flaws. Scholars have overwhelmingly shown that
the history of abortion law laid out by Justice Blackmun in Roe is
inherently flawed.88 The grounding for Roe is said to be
“untrustworthy and essentially worthless.”89 Scholars are nearly
unanimous in recognizing that the primary purpose of antiabortion laws was to provide protection for the unborn.90 For Roe
to conclude otherwise was “fundamentally erroneous.”91
Moreover, notable constitutional law scholars have asserted that
Roe has no constitutional foundation.92
Indeed, Justice Blackmun’s conclusion that a fetus is not a
constitutional “person” was based on his assertion that the State
failed to cite a case where the fetus was given such status. 93
However, there was in fact a federal case holding just that—a

See supra Part I.C for a recap of Roe’s immediate aftermath.
Karen J. Lewis, et. al., Abortion: Legislative Response, in ABORTION—MURDER OR
MERCY?: ANALYSIS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 17, 24 (Francois B. Gerard ed., 2001). The 94th
Congress alone introduced almost eighty such amendments, although each encountered
difficulty reaching the floor of the Senate and the House. The 98th Congress, however,
debated and voted on a constitutional amendment that stated “[a] right to abortion is not
secured by this Constitution.” This amendment was defeated with a vote of 50–49. Id. at
24–25.
88 BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 23; Lotierzo, supra note 3, at 280; Gregory J. Roden,
Roe v. Wade and the Common Law: Denying the Blessings of Liberty to Our Posterity, 35
UWLA L. REV. 212, 256 (2003) (demonstrating that there is no basis in pre-Roe common
law that would allow the Court to bind the states in 1973 to what it believed was the
English common law at the founding of the Country).
89 BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 23.
90 See, e.g., James S. Witherspoon, Reexamining Roe: Nineteenth Century Abortion
Statutes and the Fourteenth Amendment, 17 ST. MARY’S L. J. 29, 70 (1985) (“[T]he primary
purpose of the nineteenth-century antiabortion statutes was to protect the lives of unborn
children is clearly shown by the terms of the statutes themselves.”);; Clarke D. Forsythe &
Stephen B. Presser, Restoring Self-Government on Abortion: A Federalism Amendment, 10
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 301, 310 (2006) (noting that there are sixty-four cases from forty
states establishing that the objectives of such state laws were for the protection of the
unborn child); BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 23.
91 BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 24 (quoting James S. Witherspoon, Reexamining Roe:
Nineteenth Century Abortion Statutes and the Fourteenth Amendment, 17 ST. MARY’S L. J.
29, 70 (1985)). In Justice Blackmun’s defense, it has been suggested that his reasoning
was flawed because he relied on articles written by a scholar whose work was not
discredited until after the Court’s opinion. Id.
92 Forsythe & Presser, supra note 90, at 314–15. Such scholars include Alexander
Bickel, Archibald Cox, John Hart Ely, Philip Kurland, Richard Epstein, Mary Ann
Glendon, Gerald Gunther, Robert Nagel, Michael Perry, and Harry Wellington. Id.
93 BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 26–27.
86
87
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case cited in the Roe opinion itself.94 The case was Steinberg v.
Brown, where the federal district court in the Northern District
of Ohio had declined to extend the Griswold reasoning to
abortion rights because at that point, “the preliminaries have
ended, and a new life has begun. Once human life has
commenced, the constitutional protections found in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments impose upon the state the duty of
safeguarding it.”95 Moreover, there were more than fifty cases on
the books, both federal and state, recognizing that the unborn
child had explicit or implicit personhood.96 The Court had, and
still has, no constitutional prohibition to declare a fetus a
person.97
Thus, Roe and its progeny sit on shaky ground. If a
consensus on fetal humanity can be established, then the Court
must stay true to Justice Blackmun’s admission and not only
revisit, but also overturn, the infamous opinion.
B. Scientific Evidence of Fetal Humanity
To grasp the true significance of scientific developments, one
must first become familiar with the state of the medical
understandings before Roe. Historically, the commonly accepted
signifier of human life was known as “quickening,”98 the point at
which the mother could feel the baby move.99 The belief was that
once quickening was detectible, the unborn must have received a
soul.100 The only reason quickening was ever a standard was
because this was the point at which people could determine that
the fetus was alive—and because it was alive, it was considered
human.101 As more biological facts of human development were
discovered, the quickening theory was dismissed.102 Instead,
scientific technology has lead to the medical conclusion that
human life starts at conception.103
94 Id. Justice Blackmun cited Steinberg v. Brown as an example of a District Court
upholding an abortion restriction that was not void for vagueness or overbroad. Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154–55 (1973).
95 Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741, 746–747 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
96 Gregory J. Roden, Prenatal Tort Law and the Personhood of the Unborn Child: A
Separate Legal Existence, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 207, 270 (2003).
97 Lugosi, supra note 24, at 438.
98 BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 24.
99 BabiesOnline.com, Baby, Pregnancy, and Parenting Information: What is
Quickening?, http://www.babiesonline.com/articles/pregnancy/quickening.asp (last visited
September 29, 2009). It is now known that quickening is unreliable because, although the
baby actually starts moving by the eighth or ninth week, it could take the woman up to 26
weeks before she can detect it. Id.
100 BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 24.
101 Id. at 25.
102 Id.
103 Id.
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1. The Beginning of Life
Functions that have traditionally been used to define “life”
have been discovered to occur well within the first trimester,
before the mother may even know that she’s pregnant.104 The
baby’s heartbeat is detectible by the eighteenth day.105 Brain
cells are developed within the child’s first two weeks, while
actual brain activity has been monitored by the fifth week.106
There is evidence that an unborn child can feel pain within eight
weeks—meaning that the child can, in fact, feel pain during even
the earliest abortions.107
2. Life that is Human
Today, the scientific and medical community has widely
recognized the existence of human life from the very moment of
conception. Many contemporary human embryologists maintain
that a new human being comes to be at sygnamy (fertilization),
which is the point at which the maternal and paternal
chromosomes merge to form a set.108 Indeed, research shows that
even after initial fertilization, “[n]o substantial changes take
place . . . [the child] is the same individual organism as the adult
into whom it later develops.”109 This means that once the
chromosomes have merged in sygnamy, there is no further
genetic information needed to “make” the unborn child into an
individual human being. 110 The only things she needs for growth
and development are oxygen, food, water and healthy interaction
with her environment.111

104 It is interesting to note that Casey defined the beginning of life at respiratory
function, which seems quite arbitrary when considering that loss of such function has
never signified death. Charles I. Lugosi, Conforming to the Rule of Law: When Person and
Human Being Finally Mean the Same Thing in Fourteenth Amendment Jurisprudence, 22
ISSUES L. & MED. 119, 125–126 (2007).
105 See id.
106 Id. at 125 n.28.
107 Kerby Anderson, Arguments Against Abortion, LIFEWAY, Feb. 13, 2004,
http://www.lifeway.com/ (search for “Kerby Anderson”;; then follow “Arguments Against
Abortion” hyperlink.) This finding directly rebuts assertions in previous cases that
abortion is permissible because the fetus can feel no pain. See, e.g., Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 569 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“There can be no interest in protecting the newly fertilized egg
from physical pain or mental anguish, because the capacity for such suffering does not yet
exist.”).
108 BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 66.
109 Lugosi, supra note 104, at 123 (quoting Angelo Serra and Robert Colombo, Identity
and Status of the Human Embryo: The Contribution of Biology, in IDENTITY AND STATUTE
OF HUMAN EMBRYO: PROCEEDINGS OF THIRD ASSEMBLY OF THE PONTIFICAL ACADEMY FOR
LIFE 128, 159 (Juan De Dios Vial Correa & Elio Sgreccia eds., 1998)).
110 BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 67; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF
THE ABSOLUTES 117 (1990).
111 BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 67–68; TRIBE, supra note 110, at 117.
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The evidence of human life continues to mount in the early
stages of development. Within five or six days of conception, the
child has entered the “blastocyst” stage in which she has fully
unique human DNA.112 A study of the blastocyst stage shows
that the cells are capable of becoming only the specialized cells in
the human body.113 While it may be tempting to simply brush off
the presence of human DNA as merely “potential life,” biologists
have refuted this position.114 Instead, the modern understanding
of biologists is that the discovery of human DNA after just a few
days irrefutably demonstrates that the child, no matter how
small, “is human life; it is not potential life or potentially human
life.”115
Thus, “[i]t is scientifically correct to say that an individual
human life begins at conception, when egg and sperm join.”116
This is no theory: scientific proof of a separate embryonic
personhood is an indisputable and fundamental truth—a human
being exists from conception.117 The official labels of “blastocyst”
or “fetus” matter not—the terms are descriptive of a stage of
human life development, similar to the labels of “infant” or
“adolescent.”
Science can only go so far in the argument for constitutional
protection for the unborn. While it can establish humanity, the
law itself must recognize a personhood deserving of protection.
As will be shown next, an increase in scientific biological
knowledge of the development of the unborn has historically led
to more and more restrictive abortion prohibitions.118
C. Societal Recognitions of Fetal Personhood
Historically, common law explicitly recognized that the
killing of an unborn child was homicide.119 The crime was,
however, generally placed within the realm of manslaughter
rather than of murder.120 The reason for this downgrading is
that prior to modern scientific developments, the popular theory
Stenger, supra note 4, at 37.
James A. Thomson, Human Embryonic Stem Cells, in THE HUMAN EMBRYONIC
STEM CELL DEBATE: SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 15, 17 (Suzanne Holland et al.
eds., 2001).
114 Stenger, supra note 4, at 38.
115 Id. (emphasis added).
This is the contemporary accepted understanding of
biologists. Id.
116 BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 68.
117 Lugosi, supra note 104, at 123 (“Human embryology is so advanced there is no
doubt that a new human being is created at the time of conception.”).
118 BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 24.
119 Roger J. Magnuson & Joshua M. Lederman, Aristotle, Abortion, and Fetal Rights,
33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 767, 777 (2007).
120 Id. at 778.
112
113
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of quickening was applied.121 Contemporary laws have, however,
reflected an expansion in the rights of the unborn, including the
classification of fetal homicide as murder.122 If Roe was right,
one might expect the opposite trend. The growing rate speaks for
itself. In 2004, twenty-seven states deemed the killing of a fetus
to be criminal homicide.123 By the following year, that number
had risen to thirty-one.124 Today, thirty-six states have such
laws.125 At this rate, every state could have such a law in less
than a decade. Such fetal endangerment prosecutions reflect a
desire to protect the unborn.126 This trend has manifested itself
in both state and federal laws.
1. State Criminal Laws
After Roe held that a pre-viable unborn child is not a person
under the Constitution, the opposite occurred in state criminal
law.127 In refusing to take guidance from the Supreme Court’s
viability standard for human recognition, twenty-four states have
extended legal protection for the life of the unborn, regardless of
the stage of pregnancy.128 Arizona acted first, amending its
criminal law provisions to include protection for the fetus without
any viability requirements.129 Twenty-three other states have
since followed, the majority of which acting after Casey’s reopening of the door to the state’s interest.130 Thirteen more grant
protection once the child has reached a specified stage of
development of anywhere from seven weeks to viability.131
California’s murder statute is a good example of sidestepping Roe’s findings to recognize the killing of a fetal

Id. at 777. See supra Subsection B for an explanation of the quickening theory.
Lotierzo, supra note 3, at 285–86.
Parker, supra note 83, at 1428.
Lotierzo, supra note 3, at 284.
Americans United for Life, supra note 82 (listing the thirty-six states with
criminal laws prohibiting fetal homicide).
126 TRIBE, supra note 110, at 235.
127 Magnuson & Lederman, supra note 119, at 779.
128 Id.
129 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103(A)(5), (B) (LexisNexis 2008). The statute deems
manslaughter committed when a person causes “the death of an unborn child by any
physical injury to the mother” during “any stage of its development.” Id. at (B). To comply
with Roe, it makes exceptions for abortion procedures. Id. at (B)(1).
130 In addition to Arizona, the other states granting fetal protection under criminal
laws at all stages of the pregnancy include Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Lotierzo, supra note
3, at 284–85 n.52.
131 Id.
These states include Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New York, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee
and Washington. Id.
121
122
123
124
125
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person.132 The State’s fetal protection against criminal acts
extends to the unborn child of at least seven weeks old.133 The
original statute had no reference to the unborn, but was added to
correct a California Supreme Court ruling that did not allow a
defendant to be found guilty of murder for killing a fetus.134
While California’s courts initially followed Roe’s viability
requirement and defined fetal murder as occurring only when the
child would be able to survive on its own,135 in 1994 this position
was abandoned with a recognition that Roe’s principals were
“simply inconsistent” with fetal homicide statutes.136
Such a trend is truly a modern movement with society
“moving briskly toward the recognition of the personhood of the
unborn.”137 As biologists established a better understanding of
human science, it is no wonder that criminal liability has
followed suit.138 The states’ respect for the humanity of the fetus
has transcended both criminal and tort law: thirty states have
laws in place that will immediately make abortion illegal should
the Court reverse Roe.139

CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 2008).
People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 599 (Cal. 1994).
Monica Mendes, A Low Threshold of Guilt: Interpreting California’s Fetal Murder
Statute in People v. Taylor, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1447, 1449 (2006).
135 Katharine B. Folger, When Does Life Begin . . . or End? The California Supreme
Court Redefines Fetal Murder in People v. Davis, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 237, 247 (1994);
Mendes, supra note 134, at 1449–50.
136 Davis, 872 P.2d at 597; Mendes, supra note 134, at 1449, 1451.
137 Magnuson & Lederman, supra note 119, at 777. Some commentators assert that
fetal homicide laws are in harmony with abortion because they merely preserve the
woman’s exclusive choice to continue with or terminate her pregnancy. See, e.g., Carolyn
B. Ramsey, Restructuring the Debate over Fetal Homicide Laws, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 721, 725
(2006); cf. Mary Beth Hickcox-Howard, The Case for Pro-Choice Participation in Drafting
Fetal Homicide Laws, 17 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 317, 319–22 (2008) (explaining that fetal
homicide laws are flawed and need to be re-drafted to avoid conflicts with abortion rights).
But this Comment focuses on the significance of the status these laws give to the unborn
child: homicide is the killing of a person. If the states wanted to preserve the nonpersonhood of a fetus, the offense would have been no more than criminal assault or the
like. In fact, pushing for this lower-level type of crime as a substitute is the very thing
that Pro-Choice groups often lobby for when opposing the passage of a new fetal homicide
law. Id. at 319. Thus, fetal homicide laws are crucial because what follows is the
reasoning that since homicide is the killing of a person, the unborn child should always be
considered a person under the law.
138 It should be noted that tort law, in addition to criminal law, has increasingly
recognized fetal personhood. This is evidenced by the disregarding of the traditional
“born alive” rule, which allowed for civil remedies only when the child was born alive and
could thus bring the action herself. Magnuson & Lederman, supra note 119, at 778. Most
states have abandoned this rule because it made tortfeasors liable only if the child dies
rather than if the child was only injured by the same act. Beth Driscoll Osowski, The
Need for Logic and Consistency in Fetal Rights, 68 N.D. L. REV. 171, 175 (1992). Instead,
courts have recognized that there is a “trend in state courts toward greater legal rights for
the unborn.” Id. at 183.
139 Associated Press, Many States Would Ban Abortion if Roe Overturned,
CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Oct. 6, 2004, at 11A.
132
133
134
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2. Federal Laws Following Suit
Despite failures to legislatively overturn Roe,140 Congress
successfully passed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003
(“the Ban”).141 The Ban was passed in response to Stenberg v.
Carhart’s striking down of Nebraska’s ban on the D&X
procedure.142 The Ban criminalized abortions that deliberately
and intentionally begin to deliver the child until a significant
portion of the live infant is born and then “performing an overt
act that the [physician] knows will kill the partially delivered
living fetus.”143 Where the Court in Stenberg had declined to
address the live birth issue, Congress recognized that to allow
such a procedure would be to confuse the “medical, legal, and
ethical duties of physicians to preserve and promote life, as the
physician acts directly against the physical life of a child, whom
he or she had just delivered, all but the head, out of the womb, in
order to end that life.”144
In calling the procedure “gruesome and inhumane,” Congress
explained that a purpose for the Ban was to protect unborn
children, as future citizens, from experiencing “the pain
associated with piercing his or her skull and sucking out his or
her brain.”145 Here, there is a congressional admission that the
fetus is a citizen in need of protection, that having “potential life”
and being a “future citizen” means that one is entitled to current
rights. Also significant is that Congress outlawed the procedure
due to the pain inflicted on the unborn child. If pain is the
threshold for human life and protection, the fetus would be a
human at least at the point in which she has sensory abilities.146
The second major federal fetal rights law is the Unborn
Victims of Violence Act of 2004 (“the Act”).147 Also known as
“Laci and Conner’s Law,”148 the Act makes it a separate federal

140 Congress’s attempts to overturn Roe through a constitutional amendment are
discussed supra note 87 and accompanying text.
141 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006).
142 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 938–40 (2000).
143 18 U.S.C. § 1531(b)(1)(A) (2006); Lotierzo, supra note 3, at 279.
144 Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–105, §§ 2(1), 2(14)(J), 117
Stat. 1201, 1206 (2003).
145 Id. at 2(14)(L), (M).
146 Recall from supra Subsection B that an unborn child can feel pain even in the first
trimester.
147 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2006).
148 The law is named after Laci Peterson and her unborn son, Conner, the victims in
a 2003 California case in which a husband was convicted of killing his eight-months
pregnant wife. Scott Peterson was convicted of double-murder and given the death
penalty. Though the Act had been pending in Congress, the highly-publicized case gave it
the significant support necessary to pass. Magnuson & Lederman, supra note 119, at 780–
81.
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crime to cause death or bodily harm to an unborn child.149 Thus,
the murder of a pregnant woman constitutes a double homicide.
Moreover, the law recognizes two victims, even if the mother
survives the offense.150 Significant to the fetal rights movement
is the fact that the Act defines “a child in utero” as “a member of
the species homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who is
carried in the womb.”151 This gives the unborn child protection
under federal law as a separate person from the moment of
known pregnancy—viable or not. This “advances the theory that
unborn children should be afforded legal rights and protections
under the Constitution.”152
It is not surprising that scholars immediately noted the
conflict between this legislation and the reasoning in abortion
jurisprudence.153 And yet, the Act reflects the social climate of
the country: the legislative history notes that eighty-four percent
of Americans believe that separate homicide charges are
necessary for an unborn child.154 Congress cited its purpose for
the Act was to “respond to [the] overwhelming desire of the
American public to provide, under Federal law, that an
individual who injures or kills an unborn child . . . will be
charged with a separate offense.”155
D. The Time is Right to Correct the Wrong
Science and legislatures are not the only entities recognizing
the personhood of the fetus: the Court is getting close as well. As
notable constitutional law scholar, Erwin Chemerinsky, has
noted, “[t]here is no area of constitutional law that cannot be
changed by one or two appointments to the [C]ourt.”156 The antiRoe trend was certainly accelerated by Justices Brennan and
Marshall resigning and being replaced by Justices Souter and
149 18 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (2006); Lotierzo, supra note 3, at 281–82. The Act only
applies to harm inflicted to the unborn child during the commission of a federal crime; it
exempts the practice of abortion from liability. Id. at 283.
150 Lotierzo, supra note 3, at 303.
151 18 U.S.C. § 1841(d) (2006) (emphasis added).
152 Lotierzo, supra note 3, at 303.
153 See, e.g., Amanda K. Bruchs, Clash of Competing Interests: Can the Unborn
Victims of Violence Act and Over Thirty Years of Settled Abortion Law Co-Exist
Peacefully?, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 133, 156–57 (2004) (proposing a modification to the
legislation that would change “child in utero” to be only viable fetuses and make the
offense only an enhanced crime against the woman rather than a separate crime).
154 Lotierzo, supra note 3, at 304 (citing to H.R. REP. NO. 108-420(I), at 5). The
Congressional findings were based on a poll by Princeton Survey Research Associates and
indicated that more than half of the public supported separate charges regardless of how
far along the pregnancy was. Id. at n.249.
155 Id. at 304 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 108-420(I), at 5).
156 Jill Schachner Chanen, Senate Is Hurdle for Next Supreme Court Pick, 3 ABA J. EREPORT, Oct. 29, 2004.
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Thomas.157 Three of the Justices appointed by Presidents
Reagan and George H.W. Bush made up the plurality opinion in
Casey.158 Though the Court upheld abortion rights, this case
marked a significant turning point as the Court upheld an
abortion restriction similar to those it had struck down less than
a decade earlier.159 More recently, the additions of Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito seem to have significantly quickened
the pace towards fetal rights, with Justice Alito supplying the
crucial fifth vote in Gonzales v. Carhart160 and Chief Justice
Roberts procuring the first unanimous vote in the Court’s
abortion jurisprudence in Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood.161
Indeed, with these appointments, the Court is currently only one
vote shy of completely overturning Roe.162
With the Supreme Court “in flux,”163 a reconsideration of Roe
is an unavoidable possibility. When that day comes, the Court
will have to take into account all of the current scientific and
sociological developments.164 It would not be the first time the
Court has reversed itself to correct a false assumption.165 This is
especially true when one is reminded that at one time, women

157 MARK A. GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION: EQUAL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND
REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS 127 (1996). Justices Brennan and Marshall were part of the Roe
and Doe majorities, while Justices Souter and Thomas lean towards pro-life. Id.
158 BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 31–32; GRABER, supra note 157, at 127.
159 GRABER, supra note 157, at 127. The law upheld in Casey, as discussed supra Part
I.C, required informed consent and a mandatory waiting period; such laws had been
previously struck down by City of Akron and Thornburgh. See supra note 38.
160 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 130 (2007). See also Christopher E. Smith, et
al., The Roberts Court and Criminal Justice at the Dawn of the 2008 Term, 3 CHARLESTON
L. REV. 265, 287 (2009).
161 Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, 546 U.S. 320, 321
(2006); John F. Basaik, Jr., The Roberts Court and the Future of Substantive Due Process:
the Demise of “Split-the-Difference” Jurisprudence?, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 861, 901–902
(2007). Ayotte is significant because the Court unanimously declined the chance to strike
down a state law that lacked a health restriction, and instead decided the case on the
basis of remedy. Id.
162 Scott A. Moss, The Courts Under President Obama, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 727, 731–
32 (2009) (pointing out that because of the Justices likely to retire within the next four
years, the most that President Obama’s appointments will do is preserve the status quo).
163 Megan Fitzpatrick, Fetal Personhood After the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, 58
RUTGERS L. REV. 553, 566 (2006).
164 It is true that no Supreme Court Justice has officially taken the position that the
fetus is a constitutional “person.” TRIBE, supra note 110, at 125. However, this Comment
takes the position that the day is inevitably coming when the Court must acknowledge
the science of humanity and the recognition of fetal personhood as a genuine third party
in the abortion debate. As this section has shown, the Court itself is becoming more and
more open to the idea of admitting its faulty reasoning and correcting its mistake.
165 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (overturning a
progeny of earlier rulings dating back to Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896 which had allowed for
the segregation of public schools due to a false assumption about the extent of equal
protection). At least one scholar has suggested that Roe should be overturned on equal
protection grounds just as Brown was. Lugosi, supra note 104, at 120, 287.
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and slaves were also considered less than a “person” for the
purpose of constitutional protection.166
If the time is right, then this begs the question—now what?
If Roe is reversed and constitutional protection is granted to
unborn children, how does this affect a woman’s right to
terminate an unwanted pregnancy? The next two sections
address the conflict of interests and explore compromises before
proposing a solution that is consistent with constitutional
jurisprudence.
III. THE PROBLEM: RIGHT TO LIFE V. RIGHT TO PRIVACY
A. Stating the Obvious: Recognizing the Conflicting Interests
The law of non-contradictions necessitates a conclusion that
“an unborn child cannot be a person and a non-person at the
same time and in the same respect.”167 Recognizing that the
unborn child is a person and yet unequal under the law is simply
unjust.168 Instead, an unborn child who is granted recognition as
a person is entitled to legal protection.169 Thus, if the fetus is
finally given a classification as a constitutional person, then any
legislature that permits abortion is allowing others to deprive the
unborn child of life without due process of law and without equal
protection—a completely unconstitutional allowance.170
While the right to privacy has long been considered a sacred
right,171 it is not an absolute right and can be limited by the
conflicting right of the unborn.172 No matter where one stands on
the abortion issue, simple logic dictates that it is wrong to
continue to allow the absolute right of abortion in light of the
“accelerating of protections for the rights of the unborn.”173
Rather, there is a conflicting interest between the right to an
abortion and the right to life that must be resolved.

TRIBE, supra note 110, at 119–20.
Magnuson & Lederman, supra note 119, at 786.
See Lugosi, supra note 24, at 438.
See Heather M. White, Unborn Child: Can You Be Protected?, 22 U. RICH L. REV.
285, 288 (1988). It has also been pointed out that when the fetus is recognized as a
human being, the furthering of the unborn child’s rights is necessary in protecting the
rights of born children. Charlene Quint Kalebic, Children, the Unprotected Minority: A
Call for the Reexamination of Children’s Rights in Light of Stenberg v. Carhart, 15
REGENT U. L. REV. 223, 228 (2003).
170 TRIBE, supra note 110, at 115.
171 Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (noting that the right of
privacy is more “carefully guarded” than any other right).
172 White, supra note 169, at 292.
173 Magnuson & Lederman, supra note 119, at 785.
166
167
168
169

Do Not Delete

2009]

2/6/2010 4:36 PM

Pro [Whose?] Choice

243

B. Preliminary Solutions: Why They are Not Enough
While many scholars have come to a consensus that the
unborn child has a right to life, few have taken it a step further
and offered a solution to the conflicting interests.174 Some have
recognized that the unborn child is entitled to protection from
tortious acts under the law and yet refrain from extending this
conclusion to protect the child from death by abortion.175
However, a law that protects the fetus from abuse or neglect176
would be inconsistent if it then allows the even more grievous
tortious act of inflicting involuntary death.
Other scholars argue that the conflicting interests should be
solved by leaving it up to the states to decide whether the fetus is
a person.177 However, this is not solving the underlying issue—it
is merely delegating the decision.178 Moreover, even if it were left
to the states, more issues would arise as a result of inconsistent
laws. Consider the obvious problem that will arise when citizens
of an anti-abortion state cross into a pro-abortion state in order
to get the procedure.179 If the fetus is a protected citizen of one
state, would this status change simply because her mother
traveled into another state?180 What if the child is conceived in a
state that deems the child a person, yet his mother is a resident
of a state (or later moves to a state) where no personhood is
recognized until birth? Federalism simply cannot be relied on in
this context because the truth as to the beginning of human life
is not discretionary. History dictates that personhood is not
something that can change based on geographic location: the
Thirteenth Amendment was passed precisely to remove the
state’s power of deeming a class of citizens non-persons simply
because of their race.181 In the same way, there should be no

174 See, e.g., id. at 785–86 (pointing out the illogic of abortion rights but refraining
from calling for a solution); Lugosi, supra note 24, at 437 (arguing that the fetus has
constitutional protection but leaves it up to the states to pass laws that outlaw abortion to
spur a reversal of Roe).
175 See, e.g., White, supra note 169, at 288 (arguing that the fetus may have
protection under the law from abuse and neglect, as long as this does not “overste[p] the
parameters of the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade”).
176 Id.
177 TRIBE, supra note 110, at 126.
178 Furthermore, Roe specifically stated that should personhood be established, then
the unborn child’s right to life would be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, thus
preventing any state from making the decision to allow abortions. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 156–57 (1973). For a further discussion, see Part IV, infra.
179 Id. at 127.
180 Id.
181 See Alexander Tsesis, Principled Governance: the American Creed and
Congressional Authority, 41 CONN. L. REV. 679, 706–708 (2009) (explaining that the
legislative intent behind the Thirteenth Amendment was to guarantee that the states
would not be able to undermine equality under the law).
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state-by-state determination of personhood based on the
arbitrary factors of age, size and economic status. There needs to
be consistency among all of the states to prevent such disputes,
as they subject the existence of human life to varying degrees of
interpretation when it is instead a question of fact.
At least one scholar has suggested that deeming a fetus a
person is problematic because it treats women as incubators,
inferring that this alone should preserve the right to an
abortion.182 This, however, has nothing to do with addressing the
conflict between the interests.
Even if the woman is an
“incubator,” this argument does not adequately address the right
to life versus the right to be free from being an “incubator.”183
Instead, it is merely a restatement of the conflict between a
woman’s liberty interest of being free from carrying an unwanted
child and that child’s interest in living. But hardship on a
woman’s liberty interest has no bearing on the actual physical
personhood of the child she is carrying; while it may make some
more comfortable with the idea of abortion, it does not diminish
or resolve the underlying issue.
Another scholar has suggested that the conflict of interests is
three-fold: state, child and mother.184 To resolve these interests,
a balancing test is proposed in which the “interests of unborn
children should be weighed alongside those of pregnant women
and the state in legislative enactments and judicial review of
abortion laws.”185 Because this scholar concludes that this would
be a case-by-case analysis, there is no suggestion of how to apply
this balancing test.186 A case-by-case analysis is unworkable. In
every case, the fundamental interests are the same: interest in
protecting future citizens versus interest in saving one’s life
versus interest in obtaining an abortion. Without offering a
solution of how to weigh the competing interests, all that is
present is, again, an acknowledgement of the problem.
Thus, scholars have generally left an actual solution still
wanting.
Below is a proposal that is more consistent in
applicability and resolving of the underlying issue.

TRIBE, supra note 110, at 130.
Moreover, it is worth noting that in most cases, the woman either consciously or
negligently became this “incubator.”
184 Lotierzo, supra note 3, at 311–12.
185 Id. at 281.
186 Id. at 312.
182
183
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IV. SOLUTION: RIGHT TO LIFE MUST PREVAIL
The solution to the conflicting interests comes from what one
might find an unlikely source: Roe itself. The opinion suggests
that the right to life would prevail over the right to privacy.187
Recall Roe’s own admission that once “personhood is established,
the [case for abortion rights] of course, collapses, for the fetus’
right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the
[Fourteenth] Amendment.”188 Here, Justice Blackmun does not
state that when fetal personhood is accepted, the right to life
becomes inherent only at a certain point in the pregnancy. Nor
does he state that when fetal personhood is accepted, a balancing
test must be employed. To the contrary, the fetus’ life is
constitutionally protected and the entire case for abortion rights
collapses. This means that abortion’s right of privacy cannot be
sustained against the right of life. Simply put, the right of a
human being to live, in any analysis, must always trump the
liberty right to terminate that life.189
Merely because the unborn child lacks the capacity to assert
her rights and equal protection under the law is not an excuse to
ignore and deny those rights.190 Clearly, the unborn child would
benefit from exercising her Fourteenth Amendment right to live,
her right to prevent involuntary death.191 The unborn child has
the right to choose life for herself. The fact that she cannot
express it for herself does not diminish this right. Normally, the
child’s guardian would represent this right, but here this is the
very person with the conflicting interest. Thus, it is necessary
for the state to step in and protect the child’s rights.192
Abortion supporters will likely rebut this proposition by
asserting that the right of privacy gives the woman autonomy
over her own body without government interference; that a
woman will be subjected as an “incubator” if not given the choice
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156–57 (1973); Lotierzo, supra note 3, at 300.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 156–57.
It is important to note here that abortions necessary to save the mother’s life are
purposely left out of this analysis. This is because when the mother’s life is actually
threatened, the conflicting interests change to the right to life versus the right to life,
rather than the right to liberty versus the right to life. This Comment focuses on the
latter because abortion jurisprudence has allowed for abortions essentially on demand,
regardless of the condition of the mother. See supra note 6.
190 Rhonheimer, supra note 9, at 161.
191 Id.
192 This reasoning has been applied in European countries such as Germany that
protect the life of the unborn except in situations where the mother’s life is truly at stake.
The German court not only held that criminalizing abortion was permitted, but
constitutionally required in order to protect the lives of the unborn. Stephen Gardbaum,
State and Comparative Constitutional Law Perspectives on a Possible Post-Roe World, 51
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 685, 691 (2007).
187
188
189
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whether to carry her child to term.193 The proposed solution is
not meant to discriminate against women’s rights, but rather to
promote the rights of the unborn human being who has no choice
but to be carried by her mother for the first nine months of her
existence.
Moreover, the right of privacy assumes that the actions one
is taking affect only oneself. As soon as the actions have a
negative impact on another person, the actions transcend from
private to social.194
The unborn child is only lacking in
independence because her age requires her mother’s womb to
assure survival. This is no different from a post-birth child who
depends on her parent’s provisions of food and clothing to
survive. For that matter, it is no different from any disabled or
incapacitated adult.
A fundamental truth of human rights is that the value of
human life cannot be measured by age, size or desirability. To
deny an unborn child equal protection as a person simply because
she is small and young is scientifically incorrect. To permit a
mother to end the life of her developing baby simply because she
does not want the inconvenience of a pregnancy or parenthood is
constitutionally wrong. Roe itself called for the recognition of
fetal personhood in light of an expansion of medical and social
developments,195 and once recognized, this person’s life must be
protected above another’s lesser right. While it may not be the
easiest solution to swallow and would take a humble Court ready
to correct more than three decades of embarrassing missteps, it
is the right thing to do.
CONCLUSION
Immediate and constant criticisms of Roe and its progeny,
together with the Court’s own admission that the issue must be
readdressed when more information is known, make
reconsideration inevitable. The Court cannot forever hide from
the scientific truths that have been discovered, nor the trends in
legislation. Thus, the recognition of fetal personhood is no longer
an “if” but a “when.” And when that day comes, the Court must
193 Some scholars have anticipated that the time of recognizing fetal personhood is
drawing near and have made this argument. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 110, at 130.
194 See, e.g., Lugosi, supra note 24, at 438 (“[T]here is a limit to personal liberty when
its exercise is incompatible with not just the liberty of another, but the life of another
person.”).
195 Recall that Justice Blackmun asserted that the reason for failing to determine
fetal personhood was because “those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine,
philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 159 (1973); see supra Part I.B. Now that there is such a consensus, the Court must
be compelled to recognize personhood as well. See supra Part II.
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render a solution to the competing interests between mother and
child. To stay consistent with both constitutional and human
rights principals, the Court should stay true to its admission in
Roe and let the right to abortions “collapse.”

